the United States had declared war on Great Britain because of her infringement of neutral rights, and from other motives. And during the same month, Napoleon had begun the invasion of Russia. In October, 18113, Napoleon was decisively defeated at the battle of Leipsic. In April, 1814, the Allies entered .Pads, Napoleon abdicated, and two out of the three wars came to an end. and so on till we fetch up at the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620. To sum up the series of mistakes, the. historian would have to borrow from mathematics some infernal machine like the "binomial theorem", and would be excluded ever after from polite historical society.
The Plattsburg disaster was annoying, but it had no effect at the moment on British policy. On October 21, Bathurst wrote to Castlereagh telling him that the .New Orleans expedition was being pushed on. The Plattsburg disaster, he wrote, "will put the enemy in spirits. The campaign will end in our doing much where we thought we should have done little, and doing nothing where we expected everything." On October 28, however, Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh that "the war with America will probably now be of some duration"; and he wrote on the same day to Wellington, "The last note of the American Plenipotentiaries puts an end I think to any hopes we might have entertained of our being able to bring the war with America at this time to a conclusion."• On October 30, Wellington, writing to Bathurst, commented on the Plattsburg disaster:
It is very obvious to me that you must remove Sir G. Prevost. I see he is gone to War about trifles with the General Officers I sent him which are certainly the best of their rank in the Army and his subsequent failure and distresses will be aggravated by that circumstance; and will probably, with the usual fairness of the Publick, be attributed to it. • An amusing instance of the "war about trifles" in which Prevost had engaged will be found in a general order he issued on August 23. "The Commander of the Forces has observed in the dress of the several officers of corps and departments lately added to this army from that of Field Marshall the Duke of Wellington a fanciful variety inconsistent with the rules of the service. His Excellency deems it expedient to direct, etc., etc.'" In short, Wellington's officers had got very slack during the Peninsular campaign and required smartening up. Prevost's criticisms are fully confirmed by Professor Oman who explains that officers' dress (including his own) was a subject on which Wellington was quite indifferent. 4 .From the above account, it will be seen that up to the end of October the British government showed no intention Of changing their American policy. The war would be longer, the cost greater, the parliamentary cril;icism more severe than originally anticipated, but the policy was unchanged. excuse for the recall, it might be pretended that Wellington's services were required in connection with the American war. Next morning (November 1) Liverpool saw Macualay, but thought it better to delay any action till he could see Harrowby, for both Macaulay and Hamilton (the under-secretary at the Foreign Office) had told him that Wellington meant to "open himseli thoroughly on the subject to Harrowby."
On November 2 Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh, "You will have heard from many quarters of the combustible state of the interior of France and the expectation which exists of some explosion," and he hopes that there will be no renewal of European War.
• Of American affairs he says, "I see little prospect of our negotiations at Ghent ending in peace, and I am apprehensive that they will be brought to a conclusion under circumstances which will render it necessary to lay the papers before Parliament and to call for a vote upon them previous to the Christmas recess. Of this, however, I shall probably be enabled to speak more positively some days hence. The continuance of the American war will entail upon us a prodigious expense, much more than we had any idea of," and he goes on to caution Castlereagh against incurring any further financial obligation• in Europe. American policy would be discussed.at the cabinet meeting the following day.
On November 4 Wellington wrote to Bathurst:
I see that the public are very impatient about the want of success in America, and I expect they will never be quiet until I go there. I think that matters are in such an uncomfortable state here, and they are so little settled in Congress, that you could not spare me out of Europe?
On'November 4 Liverpool wrote to Wellington, telling him he had "communicated all the particulars which have come to my knowledge to the Cabinet, who entirely concur with me in the opinion as to the expediency of your quitting Paris without delay. "3 Liverpool then considers three alternative excuses which might be given for his quitting Paris, as the real reason must be necessarily concealed.
The first excuse of recalling him to assist at some important court-martials would be of no use, as it could last for only about a fortnight. The second excuse is that, while remaining nominally ambassador at Paris, he should be sent to Vienna to help Castlereagh at the Congress. The third excuse, and the one which Liverpool and his colleagues liked best, was that he should be recalled "to be appointed to the chief command in America, and that you should go out with full powers to make peace or to continue the war, if peace' should be found impracticable, with renewed rigour .... The more we contemplate the character of the American war, the more satisfied we are of ,the many inconveniences which may grow out of the continuance of it. We desire to bring it to an honourable conclusion; and this object would, in our judgment, be more likely to be attained by vesting you with double powers than by any other arrangement which could be suggested." Wellington replied as a statesman. He wrote two letters to Liverpool, one on the 7th, t immediately on rec. eipt of Liverpool's letter of the 4th, the other two days later, on the 0th, •-stating his views more fully. He admits that he is in danger, but he obj.ects to being hustled. "I confess I don't like to depart from Paris, and I wish the government would leave the time and the mode to my own discretion." Vienna is a bad excuse; there is no good reason for going there. The court-martial excuse would be better. He thinks his influence in Paris is becoming of more use to Castlereagh in Vienna, and he should not be withdrawn in a hurry. As regards America, "you cannot at this moment decide upon sending me to America. In case of the occurrence of any thing in Europe, there is nobody but myself in whom either yourselves or the country, or your Allies, would feel any confidence." He then gives his views on the American situation: I believe there are troops enough there for the defence of Canada for ever, and even for the accomplishment of any reasonable offensive plan that could be formed for the Canadian frontier .... That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a General, or General officers and troops, but a Naval superiority on the Lakes. The question is whether we can acquire this Naval superiority on the Lakes. If we can't, I shall do you but little good in America; and I shall go there only to prove the truth of Prevost's defence, and to sign a peace which might as well be sig•ned now.
His opinion on the Ghent negotiations must be quoted in full:
I con[ess that I think that you have no right from the state of war to demand any concession of territory from America. Considering everything, it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly honourable to the British arms; but from particular circumstances, such as the want of the Naval superiority on the Lakes, you have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military succes, and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack. You cannot then, on any principle of equality in negotiation, claim a cession of territory ex- So they made peace with•the lJnited States. Such a peace was obviously a great advantage in European complications, and this idea was much more pleasant to the ministerial mind than any unnecessary recognition of the fact that the abandoned policy should never have been started. Not only was the policy of revenge abandoned, but the fact that it had ever existed was, as far as possible, forgotten, and "Peace with America" loomed larger and larger as a wise achievement and a valuable ministerial asset.
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